Jizya in the times of Aurangzeb: Myths and facts

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Abstract

Most historians agree that the re-build of Jizya by Aurangzeb in 1679 marked a defining moment in the development of the Mughal Empire. It is also seen as the pinnacle of religious prejudice, which in turn caused the Rajputs, Marathas, and Hindus in general to become alienated and accelerated the fall of the Empire. On the other side, other writers have depicted the action as a result of the rising Hindu resistance to the Empire, leaving Aurangzeb with little choice but to turn back to a more strictly Muslim state in order to win over the Muslims' devotion. 2). In this version, the action was done as a response of the increasing spirit of defiance to the Empire among the Hindus. The growth of a spirit of particularism, together with conflict and hostility between Hindus and Muslims, are generally seen as the key factors that caused the jizya to be reinstated. Throughout this, we spoke about the Aurangzeb reign of Jizya, which was described by a variety of various current and ancient authors.

Keywords: Jizya, Aurangzeb, Mughal Empire, spirit of particularism, religious prejudice

1. Introduction

1.1. Introduction Of Jizya (TAX)

The jizya tax has historically been viewed in Islam as a payment for the protection offered by the Muslim ruler to non-Muslims, for their exemption from military service, for their right to practise a non-Muslim faith in a Muslim state with some degree of communal autonomy, and as a tangible demonstration of their submission to the Muslim state and its laws..[1] Jizya has also been interpreted differently as a badge of humiliation or as a mercy for non-Muslims in exchange for the protection given to them by the Muslims, as well as a significant source of revenue for at least some times and places (such as during the Umayyad era), and as being economically insignificant in other times and places. However, in more recent times, the jizya tax has come to be understood as Jizya [2].

There is a lack of consensus among the sources about the use of jizya funds on those who are not Muslims. According to Ann Lambton, non-Muslims did not get a portion of the advantages that were gained from the public treasury as a result of jizya. On the other hand, some Muslim historians think that Islamic history has a number of instances when the second caliph Umar ordered that the Bayt al-Mal, which some writers consider to be a symbol of Islam, provide sustenance for the impoverished and ailing dhimmis. Both the Qur'an and the Hadith include descriptions of these incidents. The agreement that Khalid bin al-Walid reached with the citizens of Al-Hirah in Iraq serves as proof that non-residents and transient residents of an Islamic state may profit from paying jizya. In accordance with this treaty, any elderly person who was frail, had lost the ability to work, had fallen sick. Hasan Shah asserts that non-Muslim women, children, the poor, and slaves are not only exempt from having to

pay the jizya but also receive aid in the form of stipends from the state treasury when it is thought suitable.[3].

'At least during the early Islamic era of the Umayyad, the Jizya tax was so onerous for non-Muslims and its revenue was so significant for rulers that there are numerous accounts of non-Muslims attempting to convert to Islam in order to avoid paying it, but the authorities forbade them from doing so because they were concerned with collecting taxes. Jizya was a levy imposed on non-Muslims to help Muslim monarchs finance their reign'.[4].

It cost one dinar per person per year during the time of the Prophet Muhammad. Umar-I, as already said, "modified this to four dinars from the rich, two dinars from the middle class, and one dinar from the lowest income bracket". Depending on the income group, the percentages are 12, 8, 6, and 4 dirhams, according to Tabari.[5]

1.2. Collection methods

The jizya was required to be paid "under despicable circumstances." Ennaji and other academics claim that certain jurists demanded that each person pay the jizya personally, in person, by showing up on foot rather than a horse, and by hand. This was done so that the individual could demonstrate that he willingly submits himself to the status of a subject and pays the tax. Some subsequent Muslims regarded the Quran to have "an ambiguous basis for debasing the dhimmi (non-Muslim) via a demeaning form of remission," Al-Nawawi, a hadith scholar who lived during the 13th century and was also a Shafi'ite jurist, made some observations about those who would impose a humiliation along with the payment of the jizya[6]. He said, "As for this aforementioned practice, I know of no sound support for it in this respect, and it is only mentioned by the scholars of Khurasan." The vast Islamic scholars agree that the jizya should be accepted with humility and compassion, just like any other kind of debt. It is generally agreed upon that this method should not be followed, and that people who developed it should be criticized for their actions. It has not been reported that the Prophet or any of the caliphs who were led by God did anything of the kind while they were collecting the jizya.[7]

1.3. Use of Jizya (Tax)

Jizya, together with zakat, Kharaj, and other fundamental taxes, was collected by the Bayt al-Mal and was one of the early Islamic state's primary sources of income[168] (public treasury). Jizya and kharaj make up four-fifths of the fay earnings, but the Hanafi and Maliki madhhabs claim that the full fay belongs to the public treasury.

Jizya money was supposed to be used for charitable causes, army pensions, and government wages. But under this pretence, cash was often deposited into the Prince's khass, or "private" fund, according to Cahen. Jizya earnings were often distributed to Islamic scholars in later periods so that they wouldn't have to take payment from sultans whose wealth was subsequently seen to be polluted. Regarding the use of jizya revenues on non-Muslims, sources differ. According to Ann Lambton, non-Muslims were excluded from receiving any of the jizya-related advantages from the public coffers. Contrarily, according to a number of Muslim historians, Islamic history has a number of instances when the second caliph Umar

ordered that the Bayt al-Mal, which some writers consider to be a symbol of Islam, provide sustenance for the weak and destitute dhimmis. Any elderly person who is frail, has lost the ability to work, becomes ill, was wealthy but became poor, or was wealthy but became poor was exempt from jiyza, and Bayt al-Maqdis would provide for their livelihood and dependents who were not permanently residing in the Islamic state, according to the treaty Khalid bin al-Walid signed with the people of Al-Hirah in Iraq. Hasan Shah claims that non-Muslim women, kids, underprivileged individuals, and slaves are not only exempt from paying the jizya but are also sometimes paid stipends from the general fund.

1.4. Under Aurangzeb Rule

New educational policies implemented during the Akbar era established a setting in which such risky judgments could be made. It seems that Akbar sought advice from several 'ulema about the abolishment of jizya. It is probable that Akbar carefully considered the availability of ijtiMid before making such a significant choice[8]. In 1575, circumstances compelled Akbar to reimpose jizya. However, he was dissatisfied with this choice and eventually made religious tolerance a priority in his policies. He also began upholding Sulh-i-lofty kul's ideals (peace with all). He ultimately did away with the jizya in 1580. It took Akbar 24 years to finally eradicate it since it lasted until 1679. Akbar renounced the idea of a taqlid (faithful follower) and replaced it with ijtihad.[9]

In 1679, Aurangzeb reintroduced the jizya. The opinions of historians on this reimposition vary greatly. There is no official history since Aurangzeb ceased compiling it in his tenth year of rule; nonetheless, there are allusions to jizya in Aurangzeb's ruq'at (letters), 16 raqaim (epistles), 17 tauqiat (orders), 19 aother records. The issue of the re-imposition of jizya has caused great disagreement among modern historians due to various perspectives stated by current authors. There are certain fundamental problems that have arisen, including I Why did Aurangzeb re-impose it 21 years after his accession to the throne? (ii) Did he seek to punish the Hindus or adhere to the Shari'a (Islamic law)? (iii) Did he reinstate the jizya on his own initiative or was it forced upon him by the 'ulema in order to ameliorate the economic crisis? These concerns are going to be investigated in light of Aurangzeb's own words that are documented in the Collection Documents that are associated with the jizya[10].

On the basis of all of these sources, a number of historians who specialize in the history of medieval India have researched the reign of Aurangzeb and shed light on a number of significant features of that period [11]. There are a number of utterances attributed to Aurangzeb that were made in relation to jizya. After delegating the duty of collecting jizya to Yar Ali, he made the following observation: "I have personally altered the obligation of the collection of jizya." Firoz Jang made the argument to Aurangzeb that it was essential to raise the amount of grain that was sold in the local market so that there would be enough food for the imperial camp. Aurangzeb agreed with Firoz Jang. However, this could not be put into practice without first exempting Hindus from the need to pay the jizya tax[12]. As a result, he presented the Emperor with the following petition: "Please order that 'Inayatullah Khan may transmit a sanad (order) of exemption from jizya."

I do not accept servants from among the kafirs, the Emperor wrote down once he had finished thinking (infidels). You are thousands of steps removed from the perfect wisdom and adherence to the shari'a possessed by this trusted servant who is aware of my feelings in your desire to colonise the grain market at the tomb and in your disobedience of the Holy Quran's directive regarding jizya, which is to "chastise them until they pay jizya with the hands showing they are humbled" and "they deserve if they excused." [13]. Evidently, a bunch of your buddies have misled and blinded you, and because of their despicable behavior—which is worse than sweepers—they have created a place in your heart where this useless notion may tempt you with offers of petty greed. This is because your friends have a history of raising men's suspicions, making them more evil than sweepers. How could a person their age, who has had a lot of life experience, be deceived by a lie??

"Go away! If the Phoenix's nest is constructed too high, you should build this trap for some other bird". This is proof that comes straight from Aurangzeb's ahkam (court records). It demonstrates Aurangzeb's level of concern with respect to the issue of jizya and the degree to which he was engaged in it due to the fact that he was a religious man[14].

1.5. Opinions of Contemporary Scholars

According to the author Saqi Mustaid Khan, who based his writing on official documents, "Aurangzeb despatched a farman (Royal Order) to the diwans of the subas (provinces) to collect jizya according to shari'a from zimmis." This also demonstrates Aurangzeb's strong adherence to shari'a law and the fact that he commanded the collecting of jizya.

According to Ishwardas Nagar, theologians, jurists, and educated people proposed that the jizya be collected from non-believers in accordance with Islamic law (shari'a). This was carried out while taking into account the Emperor's religious sensitivities.. The Emperor recognized that the task of overseeing the collecting of jizya was one of the incumbent and required tasks, and he thus selected 'lnayatullah Khan to fulfill this role[15].

According to another chronicler, Khafi Khan, Aurangzeb ordered the collecting of jizya from Hindus in order to punish them and preserve a division between Hindus and Muslims. Hindus opposed the re-imposition of jizya, but the Emperor ignored them. This assertion by Khafi Khan is not credible since other recorded evidence opposes it. In terms of the Shari'a, there is no idea of punishment via the imposition of jizya. Second, the difference could not have been maintained by applying jizya alone. There were already differences between Hindus and Muslims based on their respective religious practises. Bakhtawar Khan said that the Emperor, who upheld the Shari'ah (Islamic law established by Prophet Muhammad), authorised the collection of jizya from Hindus. This is a rather general assertion. In Miriitul 'Alam, the same author states, "Aurangzeb reimposed jizya on Hindus according to the directions of the Shari 'a, and as a consequence, one lakh Hindus were converted to Islam during his reign." There is no direct proof in other texts of Hindus being converted as a consequence of the application of jizya[16].

However, there is evidence to suggest that conversion took place in return for the gaddi or other favours from the Emperor. We also have proof that the Hindu community organised

protests against the re-imposition of the legislation. According to Malik Zadah Manzoor, Mutasaddis (revenue department officials) of Sarkiir-i-KhZilisai-Sharifa (a subdivision designated for Royalty) have been given the mandate to collect jizya from Hindus in accordance with Shari'a and, once the collection is complete, to notify it along with the signature and seal of karori (revenue department official) regarding the precise amount collected against jizya Furthermore, it is apparent that mutasaddis were requested to collect jizya and to keep watch over the collection process. They were required to submit a report with the karori's seal and signature in addition to noting the exact amount of jizya money received. This demonstrates Aurangzeb's profound anxiety with the jizya collecting process.[17].

Bhim Sen, who stayed in the southern region for a greater portion of his life, asserts that "Jizya was imposed and collected by force in the Deccan." 49 This also demonstrates that Aurangzeb was quite precise about the execution of this levy, and that he did not tolerate any opposition from the Hindus. He saw this as a direct challenge to his authority.

Ali Muhammed is another person who has opinions that are similar to those of Ishwardas Nagar. He reveals that Aurangzeb adhered to the shari'a in all parts of his life, including the political sphere. The 'ulema advised Aurangzeb to reinstate the jizya because they knew how much respect he had for the shari'a. One can't help but wonder whether the 'ulema had the courage to make any kind of suggestion to Emperor Aurangzeb. In point of fact, these darbari 'ulema were able to keep their positions thanks to the Emperor's favor as well as gifts of madad-i-ma ash (land given to intellectuals, etc.). Qaziul Quzat Abdul Wahab, also known as the Chief Justice, was willing to grant whatever shari'a favor that Aurangzeb requested. Shaikh Abdul Wahab was the one who issued the fatwa (decree) that allowed Aurangzeb to practice kharuj (disobedience)[18]. During Shah Jahan's lifetime, Aurangzeb's name was recited in the khutba (Friday sermon delivered by Khatib), and these 'ulema had granted fatwa of ilhad (heresy) for the killing of Dara Shikuh. Why hadn't this 'ulema proposed the reimposition of jizya back in 1658? It is abundantly obvious that Aurangzeb attempted to adhere to the shari'a in the administration, based on a review of the claims made by contemporaneous historians. This conclusion can be drawn from the evidence. During this process, it was only natural for Aurangzeb to re-impose jizya on the Hindus.

2. Modern historians Quotes

Modern historians have conducted research on the policies implemented by Aurangzeb, particularly with relation to the re-imposition of jizya in 1679, using both contemporaneous literature and the narratives of European travellers, as well as the records themselves[18].

According to J.N. Sarkar what has to say on the topic, "As the scholars and divines of the time informed Aurangzeb, the books on Muslim canon law lay down that the proper method of collecting jizya is for the zimmis to pay jizya personally," "As the scholars and divines of the time informed Aurangzeb," "According to S.R. Sharma's point of view, "Puritan in his beliefs, Aurangzeb dreamed for the day when God's kingdom would be established on earth. By the year 1679, Aurangzeb had progressed so far down the road of puritanism that it was

feasible for him to order the imposition of jizya onto non-Muslims based on the depiction of "Inayat Khan, diwan-i-khalisa."" According to the opinion of Zahiruddin Faruki, the proposition was examined not only from the perspective of the religion, but also, as there are grounds to believe, from the perspective of the economy. When the treasury had suffered significant financial losses, the implementation of jizyah was brought up to him as a potential solution to the problem. The proposition was suitable for him from a theological as well as a financial point of view[19].

A Muslim scholar named Sir Saiyd Ahmed Khan was the first to object to the notion that Aurangzeb should reimpose jizya on the Muslim community. He believes that Aurangzeb's mentality was to blame for Hindus being denied rights throughout his reign. On the other side, Shibli Nomani contends that Hindus ought to be appreciative of the jizya's restoration since it was advantageous to them. According to Lane Poole, Aurangzeb "used religion as a cloak for ambition." 62 After significant research into the issue of jizya, Satish Chandra has offered a solution. According to Aurangzeb, who was inherently conservative, nothing could have looked more fitting than for the new stage of the empire's growth to be marked by the re-imposition of jizya, which represents the return to a more traditional style of state[20]. Nothing could have been more fitting than for the re-imposition of jizyah to usher in the next stage of the empire's growth, the speaker claims. In regards to the strictly economic motivation, he continues, it is true that when Aurangzeb examined his accounts in the thirteenth year of his reign, he discovered that spending had outpaced revenue over the twelve years before. This was revealed in the thirteenth year of Aurangzeb's rule, when he realised that his spending had surpassed his revenue. Another assumption is that the royal treasury must have been burdened by the continual battles in the Deccan, particularly those that started after 1676. [21].

2.1. Zimmis's Position and Status

Let's look at a zimmi's standing and position in relation to the jizya laws that are prescribed by the shari'a. Zimmis comes in two different varieties, which are as follows: Ahl-i-Kitab, which includes those with access to revealed books including Christians and Jews, and Mushrikin, which includes Muslims ('pagans -those who do not possess the revealed scriptures'). Zimmis may be divided into two distinct groups: people who came in the Islamic State peacefully and who were successful in the battlefield. For people in the Islamic State after a treaty was signed, the Islamic State had no right to alter any situations laid out in the agreement, such as that their lands wouldn't be occupied by the State or by Muslims, that they wouldn't be subject to harsh criminal laws, that the State wouldn't interfere with their religious affairs, that the State wouldn't act arrogantly toward them, and that their religious sites wouldn't be damaged.

The State had the authority to seize the lands of the second group of the zimmis, the vanquished, murder all of their male members, and sell their women and kids into slavery. They may be given the status of zimmis, at the discretion of the State. This wasn't anything the State had to do. Jizya collection from this particular zimmis was approved by Hanafi Fiqh. If a zimmi changed his address from darul harb (a land ruled by pagans) to darul Islam,

he would have to pay the jizya (a country administered by an Islamic government). If he purchased property in a darul-Islam, he would also be obligated to pay jizya. Women, children, insane persons, the elderly, individuals with disabilities, and workers, however, were excluded from paying the jizya under all schools of Islamic law [21].

Even if he stopped paying jizya, murdered a Muslim, or talked ill of the Prophet Muhammad, a zimmi would still be entitled to the same rights. When someone deserted darul Islam or rebelled against the Islamic State, they were no longer considered to be a zimmi. Despite the fact that many traditional beliefs and activities are forbidden by the shari'a, the Zimmis were allowed to continue to follow such traditions anyway. On the other hand, the State was permitted to control such rituals in areas that were mostly Muslim. They were free to maintain or rebuild their houses of worship since the state did not intrude on their property in any way. Even the building of new temples was not prohibited, but the erection of such buildings was not permitted in areas dominated by Muslims. In the case that the jizya was not paid, the person in default was not permitted to sell any of his property, whether it was movable or immovable. In the case that zimmis failed to pay their kharaj (also known as land tax), the exact same terms and circumstances were enforced[22].

Jizya was able to be postponed for a length of time under one of the following four scenarios: continual conflicts; crop failure; when the state was unable to guarantee them (that is, the zimmis) security of life and property; or when a zimmi joined the army. And if it were to continue to be saqit for a number of years, the State was obligated to waive the jizya payments for the whole of that time period[23].

Even the property of zimmis in the captured state could not be sold to Muslims. This rule applied even after the state was taken over. They were free to play the niqqus (gong), but they were not allowed to do so during namaz (prayer). They may go out and participate in their religious processions[24]. The Zimmis lived according to their own set of personal laws. Zimmis were allowed to get financial assistance from Baitulmal despite their poverty. A tax equal to five percent of the value of the zimmi dealer's wares was needed to be paid by the dealer. They could not be coerced into serving in the military by the state. They were allowed to enlist in the military provided that they paid the jizya. Zimmis were known to wear high hats, shoes with multiple laces, and zunnar (a kind of cord). It was agreed that whatever privileges that they had been granted in accordance with the terms of the treaty would not be taken away after the fact. They would maintain ownership of the property from one generation to the next, and the state would be legally precluded from purchasing the land. If a Zimmi wished to sell his land, he was not permitted to sell it to a Muslim, even if the Muslim wanted to buy it[25].

2.2. Rate of Jizya under Aurangzeb rule

According to author Irfan Habib, under the rule of Aurangzeb, people with incomes of 10,000 dirhams or more were forced to pay 48 dirhams in taxes, followed by middle-class individuals at 24 dirhams and those with incomes of 200 dirhams at 12 dirhams.

The entire amount of money collected by jizya in every region of the empire, according to the writings of Shivdis Lakhnawi, who lived in the eighteenth century, was forty million rupees. Even though this number refers to the (re)abolition of jizya that Raja Jai Singh ordered after the Saiyid brothers were routed in 1720, it may be interpreted to refer to the whole empire after the conquest of Bijapur and Golconda. The Saiyid brothers lost in 1720. The Saiyid brothers lost in 1720. According to Jagjiwandas, the Empire's basil throughout the years 1708–1709 stood at a little bit more than 260 m.[26].

On the basis of these numbers, it is possible that the revenue from jizya accounts for around 15% of the overall income. On the other hand, it is possible that the whole amount of the jizya might not be realized each and every year. According to the Nigarnama-i-Munshi, which is another work from the eighteenth century, the jizya was initially calculated at rupees one hundred upon one hundred thousand dams (of the jama'), which is equivalent to a flat rate of four percent in the khalisa and jagir mahals. The officials of the khalisa and the jagir-holders were given the freedom to collect the amount from the peasants in whatever manner they In the event that crops failed to produce, a jizya exemption may be requested, and it seems that such exemptions were granted on a rather consistent basis. It seems that each of the towns was given a distinct rating. Even a reasonable estimate of the amount of money that can be made from them is difficult to establish[27].

Khafi Khan claims that Mir 'Abdul Karim, the amin-i-jizya, stated in 1092/1681 that he had established Rs. 1,0,8000/- as the sum owed by half of the wards (pur-jat) of Burhinpur and had realized Rs. 26000/- as jizya from the city of Burhinpur during the previous year. According to a record relating to the town and pargana of Badshahpur, the town's portion of a total assessment of Rs. 2950/- was Rs. 2140-10.0, or nearly 72%. Even if it is challenging to make broad conclusions from such little data, it may not be incorrect to assume that the towns' revenue was sizable. This may help to explain why protests against the jizya took place so often in the cities, with traders and merchants frequently taking the lead. All products imported by Christian merchants, or the English, French, Portuguese, and other European Companies operating with India, were subject to an extra levy of 1.5 percent in place of jizya. As a result, the jizya yield was not insignificant. However, it should be emphasized that the revenues were to be used for philanthropic endeavors and were to be deposited in a different treasury known as the Khazana-i-jizyah. In light of this, jizya can only be seen as a tool for reducing the strain on the general treasury inasmuch as it can be shown that the state was able to make savings on the sums being distributed out of the general treasury for paying the yaumiydars or cash stipend-holdets.

2.3. Reasons Behind the Collection of Jizya

Aurangzeb evaluated his finances in the 13th year of his reign, he discovered, during the previous twelve years, his spending had surpassed his revenue. This is relevant when discussing the solely economic motivation for Aurangzeb's actions. As a direct result of this, a variety of cost-cutting measures were implemented, one of which was "the reduction of several items in the expenditures of the Emperor, the princes, and the Begums." The royal treasury must have been under strain due to the ongoing conflicts in the Deccan, especially

after 1676, the frontier wars in the north-east, the sporadic battles with Afghan tribesmen, and the later break with the Rathors and Sishodias, none of which resulted in significant territorial gains or monetary rewards. This is a presumption that can be supported by evidence. During his reign, Aurangzeb issued a series of ordinances prohibiting a vast number of different rites and ceremonies that were previously practiced. Previous kings had issued commands that were quite similar to this one. It has been brought to our attention that the revenue department, in defiance of our directives, has persisted in include the income from the prohibited cesses in the jama'dami (value) of the jagirs 1). It would seem that it was anticipated that the jagirdars would make these remissions out of the revenue that they had been sactioned. However, only a small number of nobility, like Raja Jaswant Singh, offered their services. Others desired payment in lieu of the income they were required to give up, but there was not enough money to do so; as a result, the remission remained a mere formality in the jagirs. Others demanded payment in place of the income they had to give up. The claim that since Aurangzeb abolished the cesses that were not authorised by Islam, he was justified in levying the jizya, one of the taxes that is particularly authorised by Islamic law, does not have much support. This is due to the weak foundation of the argument.

2.4. Different author views regarding collection of jizya (tax)

J.N. Sarkar, a leading expert on the reign of Aurangzeb, writes: "Aurangzeb was told about the collecting of jizya by the learned scholars and divines of the period. The most educated and well-read of all the Mughal emperors was Aurangzeb. He invested one million rupees in the upkeep of his book collection in order to protect it ". Aurangzeb had a strong understanding of the Islamic legal system. Under his direction, a group of 'ulema worked together to prepare Fatwa-i-Alamgiri. For the first time ever, an effort was undertaken in India to compile the views of Islamic jurists on numerous topics related to Islamic law into separate chapters for the convenience of the 'ulema who occupy the positions of qazi, muhtasib, etc. in India. In India, this was the first time that such an initiative had been undertaken. It is unnecessary for the 'ulema to impart this information to Aurangzeb since it is unrelated to the topic and he was aware of the sharia.

In accordance to Zahiruddin Faruki, the suggestion was reviewed from both a religious and a financial point of view. This was stated in the previous sentence. Because it is a component of Islamic fiqah, those who believe that the re-imposition of jizya was motivated only by religious considerations are correct in their assessment of the situation. But Aurangzeb never said anything about the economic ramifications of re-imposing it at any point in time. Contrary to what was indicated by Zahiruddin Faruki, Aurangzeb made a remark that was recorded in Ahkam-i-Alamgiri (the entire text of Aurangzeb's statement is provided above). This statement can be found in Ahkam-i-Alamgiri. Second, the revenue that was collected through the jizya was not intended to ease the financial burden; rather, it was to be given to the baitulmal and was to be used on things that were stipulated in the Shari'a. During the second part of Aurangzeb's reign, the revenue that the empire received through jizya was insufficient to pull the kingdom out of the economic crisis that it had been experiencing from the beginning of his reign.

In accordance to Satish Chandra, Aurangzeb was a traditionalist, and he sought to move the Mughal administration in the route of an orthodox state when he reinstated the jizya (tax). In addition to this, he places considerable emphasis on the monetary component of the reimposition of jizya. The economy was in shambles, so Aurangzeb reinstated the jizya tax as a means of stabilizing the situation. In addition to this, he connects this to the issue of high unemployment rates among Muslims. By re-establishing the jizya tax, Aurangzeb hoped to stimulate the economy by creating new job openings. 'Inayatullah Khan brought a letter written by the Sharif of Mecca that advised to Aurangzeb that he should collect jizya. The note was addressed to Inayatullah Khan. By 1678, he had the intention of rallying the Muslim community to his cause. It is abundantly obvious from the letters that Aurangzeb wrote and are preserved in Adab-i-Alamgiri that from the very beginning, Aurangzeb placed a strong focus on the Shari'a (when he was a prince). And subsequently, when he became an emperor, the focus continued to be the same, as is obvious from the collections of his letters and instructions in Ruqait-i-Alamgiri, Raqam-i-Karaim, Shuqajat-i-Alamgiri, Kalimat-i-Taiyibat, and Ahkam-i-Alamgiri. In none of his letters or instructions does he make any mention of the economy or the reasons behind it.

3. Fact and myths about Jizya (re-imposed)

Additional problems arose as a result of the jizya's reinstatement, both administratively and monetarily. Strong protest was raised against this requirement. One wonders how many individuals would have been employed in this profession given the unemployment crisis. The declarations of Aurangzeb, contemporary writers, European visitors, or evidence indicating how the problem of unemployment among Muslims may be addressed include no hint of the re-imposition of jizya. While mentioning the note from the Sharif-i-Mecca that urged the reinstatement of the jizya, Satish Chandra neglects to mention the fact that the same Sharif rejected Aurangzeb's gift of money on grounds that he couldn't accept sacrifices from a son whose father was still alive. By "taking advantage of the luxury of India, by begging money for the impoverished in Mecca, and appropriating for his own use," the Sharif had violated morals, according to Aurangzeb's warning in Kalimat-i-Taiyibat. [28]. Aurangzeb refers to Mian Abdul Latif's suggestions in Rugat-i-Alamgiri rather than the Sharif-i-Mecca recommendations. Because of his knowledge of Islam, Aurangzeb did not need the counsel of any 'alim or Sharif-i-Mecca. It does not seem to be true that Aurangzeb reinstated jizya in 1678 because he had failed. As a result, contrary to what Satish Chandra says, the reimposition of jizya in 1679 seems to be a component of his broader strategy rather than the outcome of his failure in 1678.

Muzaffar Alam is of the opinion that the re-imposition of jizya was brought about as a direct consequence of the ulema's increased level of pressure on the government. There is no question that the 'ulema were an essential aspect of the empire; nonetheless, it should be emphasized that they operated under the direct supervision of the Emperor. Although it is certain that Aurangzeb used the 'ulema, there is no proof that he made allowance the 'ulema to apply him in any manner. The 'ulema had a secondary purpose, and the emperors were in no way subject to their influence. On his way from the Deccan to Agra, Shaikh Abdul Wahab

issued a fatwa in favour of Prince Aurangzeb. This was done in an unconstitutional way. As was said before, Abdul Wahab was the one who announced Aurangzeb's name at the khutba. In response to Aurangzeb's directives, a number of 'ulema affixed their names to a mahzar-i-ilhad, also known as a declaration of heresy, condemning Dara Shikuh. These 'ulema even extended favors to Aurangzeb that went against the tenets of shari'a law, which is the Islamic legal code. They survived because of the madad-i-mash handouts. As a result, these darbari-'ulema were unable to influence the Emperor. They had completely forgotten their obligations as alim because they had made living the darbari life their main goal instead of doing what was required of them as Muslims. There were a few noteworthy exceptions, but this particular 'ulema was unrelated to either the Emperor or the darbar. When Qazi Abdullah asked Aurangzeb for mercy in the Golkunda Fort siege, the emperor reminded him that he lacked the right to make such recommendations and forbade him from attending the darbar. It was also banned for Qazi Abdullah to enter the darbar.

All of this, according to J.N. Chaudhuri, was carried out by Aurangzeb as a part of an orthodox reform initiative that led to the fall of the Mughal empire. The chronicler at issue don't make a distinction among Islam and Muslims. The Mughal monarchy and administration were founded on muliyat (monarchy), a form of government that is fundamentally incompatible with Islamic principles. There are more components to the Islamic State than only the jizya and the zakat. Since Aurangzeb was the Badshah of the Mughals, it is unclear how he could have initiated or guided an orthodox reform campaign.

Some 'ulema, like Molvi Muhammed Yaqub, and sufis, like Shah Kalimullah, avoided Aurangzeb since he was the monarch because of this. Aurangzeb is thus often and mistakenly presented as a "champion" of Islam. According to Hameeda Khatoon Naqvi, Aurangzeb was compelled to rely on the orthodox since he was unable to win the allegiance of the Shi'as and the Hindus. She says this is because Aurangzeb was a hypocrite. Because of this, he had no choice but to reinstate the jizya in order to win over the support of the religious conservatives. When it comes to Aurangzeb, Naqvi considers both the Hindus and the Shi'as to be "enemy." However, she ignores the reality that Aurangzeb could not have risen to the position of Mughal emperor outwardly backing of 27 'ranis and 21 Hindus who held important mansabs in the Mughal aristocracy.

According to Islamic law, the following situations nullify the need to pay jizya: Due to an economic crisis, the zimmis are unable to pay it; due to threats from the inside or outside, the Islamic State is unable to protect the zimmis and their belongings; due to joining the army of the Islamic State; due to zimmis rebelling in opposed to the Islamic State; and due to a zimmi moving from one region to another. There are other cases when the jizya was not collected, and even in those cases where it was payback to the people. Because Abu Obaid could not provide the Zimmis of Syria security from outside aggressors, he gave back the money that he had received as jizya to those people. During the reign of Umar I, those Zimmis who volunteered for military duty were excused from having to pay the jizya (tax).

3.1. Suspend of Jizya (Tax)

In light of the destruction caused by hunger and the impending conflict with the Marathas, Satish Chandra is of the opinion that Aurangzeb ultimately suspended the payment of jizya in the Deccan in the year 1704 for the length of the conflict. The suspension of the jizya was, in all ways and purposes, the same thing as renouncing it, and it represented Aurangzeb's strong indication of the fact that the religious policy that he had announced with such a great deal of fanfare in 1679 had been unsuccessful. It had become obsolete as a result of the collapse of the Deccan states, and at that time, there was a strong feeling that a more moderate approach was required in order to win over the population.

According to observations made by Satish Chandra, Aurangzeb's policy of strict orthodoxy, which reached " "climax with the Marwar war and the re-imposition of jizya in 1679, was not reversed by his great-grandson, Farrukh Siyar, in 1713 nor by Farrukh Siyar's cousin, Jahandar Shah, a year earlier. Instead, it culminated in 1679 with the Marwar war. In the latter portion of Aurangzeb's reign, the reversal of fortunes got underway, with Aurangzeb's knowledge and either his willing or hesitant agreement ". The data that is available now, however deny this notion. In 1710, when Bahadur Shah I was departing for the Deccan, residents of Atoda in Kotah petitioned for an end to the jizya. 147 Then, on May 2, 1711, Jai Singh and Muhammad Taqi, the diwan of suba Agra, pleaded, due to terrible conditions the people of his watan were living in, they were unable to pay jizya. Jai Singh claimed that the residents in his watan were unable In 1717, when Fanukh Siyar reinstituted the payment of jizya, he did so at the urging of a man named 'Inayatullah Khan Kashmiri, who was Aurangzeb's munshi and a devoted student. Therefore, with the exception of a brief interruption, jizya was collected all the way up until 1717, which is decade thereafter Aurangzeb's endlife. The evidence refutes Satish Chandra's claimed Aurangzeb's Islamic policy was overturned throughout his reign by showing that certain of the emperor's supporters, such as 'Inayatullah Khan and Muhammed Amin Khan, worked to preserve some components of it even after he had gone away. Muhammad Amin Khan allegedly proposed the return of jizya while serving as wazir under Muhammad Shah, according to "H.K. Naqvi, an orthodox Muslim and supporter of Aurangzeb's policies". Muhammed Amin Khan was also a supporter of Aurangzeb's ideas (1719-40). Both Jai Singh and Girdhar Bahadur were opposed to this idea, and as a result, they did not give Muhammed Am in Khan permission to reinstate the jizya tax. An investigation into the individuals' personal life indicates that they did not rigorously adhere to the sharia, despite the fact that it was believed that individuals such as Muhammed Amin Khan were attempting to project Sharia via the re-imposition of jizya. They participated in a wide variety of behaviors that violated the tenets of the Islamic law known as shari'a. The following comment made by Norris confirms Inayatullah Khan's perspective: " 'Inayatullah Khan gives consistent association of his interests with those of the Emperor." All of this points to the fact that certain aristocrats, who were passionate followers of Aurangzeb's policies even after his end of life, were carrying on the Emperor's legacy thereafter he had passed away.

4. conclusion

The reintroduction of the jizya was thus a gesture that served no purpose. Powerful aristocracy, notably Jahanara Begum, opposed it. After Aurangzeb's death, his top nobles Asad Khan and Zulfiqar Khan abolished jizya. They represented the governing elite that found jizya politically inconvenient and disagreeable any increase in clergy dominance or political meddling and Non-state Hindu Rajas hated it. Jizya incidence on each part is difficult to calculate, but Historical government estimates city laborers paid around one month's earnings in jizya. However, regular laborers and persons who earned enough to sustain themselves and their families may have been considered "unemployable" and exempt from jizya. While Aurangzeb strongly opposed jizya exemptions, they seem to have been granted often. Due to drought and conflict, jizyah was remitted over the Deccan in 1704. The jizya collectors harassed and oppressed these individuals, so they staged hartals and public protests. Finally, political opponents of the Empire used jizya to organize Hindu opposition. Aurangzeb's trial with jizya showed that it was impossible to base India's polity on the shari'a and distinguish between Hindu and Muslim citizens. Akbar's secularist state and the Sultanate's restricted state failed.

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